

Message Text

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TO USMISSION NATO

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E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJ: TROOP LEVELS

ATTN: DR. GOLDWIN, SPECIAL ADVISER TO AMBASSADOR

1. RE TELECON AUG 8, QUOTED BELOW IS
PERTINENT PORTION OF RUSH TESTIMONY BEFORE HOUSE FOREIGN
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, JULY 10, ON TROOP LEVELS. BEGIN QUOTE:
MR. FINDLEY. MR. SECRETARY, MR. HAYS VERY CLEARLY POINTED
OUT THE DANGER OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL ON OUR PART, BUT IS
THERE NOT ALSO A SUBSTANTIAL DANGER IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE
SOVIET UNION ON TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE IF THEIR OBJECTIVE
IS TO GET US OUT OF NATO AND THUS GET OUR TROOPS OUT OF
EUROPE AND THUS WRECK NATO? WOULD IT NOT MAKE SENSE FOR
THEM TO SUCK US IN ON A MBFR DEAL UNDER WHICH WE SUBSTANTI-
ALLY REDUCED TROOPS IN EUROPE, THEN PROCLAIM THAT WE HAVE
PEACE IN OUR TIME AND THEN AT THEIR OWN CONVENIENCE MOVE
BACK IN AND THUS CONTROL THE CONTINENT?

"MR. RUSH. YOU POSE A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM, MR. FINDLEY.
OBVIOUSLY THE SOVIETS ARE IN EUROPE, THEY CAN WITHDRAW
TROOPS JUST A FEW HUNDRED MILES AND THEY ARE BACK IN THE
SOVIET UNION, WHILE WE WITHDRAW OURS ACROSS THE OCEAN TO A
DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEM WHERE IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT
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FOR US TO PUT THEM BACK.

"THIS POSES ONE OF THE REAL PROBLEMS OF THE MBFR TALKS, AND IT IS ONE THAT WE MUST BE VERY FULLY AWARE OF AS WE PROCEED WITH THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

"MR. FINDLEY. I FEEL FRANKLY VERY NERVOUS ABOUT US NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIET UNION VITAL TO OUR AND WESTERN EUROPE TROOP LEVELS. IT WOULD SEEM FAR MORE PRUDENT FOR THE SOVIETS WITH OUR NATO ALLIES TO WORK OUT WITH THEM THE DETAILS OF A LONG-TERM FORCE COMMITMENT THAT WE COULD LIVE WITH AND THEY COULD LIVE WITH AND WOULD GIVE US ALL ASSURANCES OF CONTINUITY IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

"I HAVE NOT SEEN ANY SIGN THAT OUR ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN TRYING TO WORK OUT A LONG-TERM UNDERSTANDING OR COMMITMENT OR AGREEMENT OF THAT SORT. I HAVE BEEN HOPING THAT WITH THE BEGINNING OF MR. NIXON'S SECOND TERM THAT WE COULD SEE THIS TAKE SHAPE, BUT SO FAR I HAVE SEEN NO SUGGESTION THAT THIS MIGHT BE IN THE FUTURE. THE ONLY HINT I HAD WAS MR. KISSINGER'S SPEECH IN NEW YORK IN WHICH HE TALKED ABOUT THE NEW ATLANTIC CENTER, BUT SINCE THEN THERE HAS BEEN NO DEFINITION, NO DETAIL FROM IT. IS THERE ANY PROSPECT IN YOUR VIEW OF A LONG-TERM UNDERSTANDING BEING WORKED OUT WITH OUR NATO ALLIES WHICH WOULD INVOLVE A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN US FORCES IN EUROPE?

"MR. RUSH. I DO NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN ANY WAY TO OUR NATO ALLIES FOR US TO WORK OUT A UNILATERAL REDUCTION WITHOUT REDUCTIONS ON THE OTHER SIDE. THE QUESTION OF REDUCTIONS OF STATIONED TROOPS, FOR EXAMPLE, OR INDIGENOUS TROOPS IS A VERY DIFFICULT ONE BECAUSE IF WE START REDUCING UNILATERALLY IN EUROPE THEN THE EUROPEANS ARE FACED WITH THE SAME POLITICAL PROBLEMS AS WE, AND THEY WILL BE FACED WITH VERY HEAVY PRESSURE TO REDUCE THEIR TROOPS.

"MR. FINDLEY. IN FACT SEVERAL OF THEM HAVE BEEN REDUCING?

"MR. RUSH. DENMARK REDUCED SOME IN 1972.

"MR. FINDLEY. THERE IS THE SAME POLITICAL PRESSURE IN EUROPE FOR TROOP REDUCTIONS THAT EXISTS IN THIS COUNTRY, UNCLASSIFIED

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AND IT WOULD SEEM TO ME PRUDENT TO ACCOMMODATE THOSE NATURAL TRENDS AND PRESSURES BY WORKING OUT A LONG-TERM UNDERSTANDING WHICH ALTHOUGH PROVIDING FOR LOWER FORCE LEVELS WOULD NEVERTHELESS CONVEY TO OUR ALLIES AND TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT NATO IS NOT ABOUT TO BE NEGOTIATED OUT OF BUSINESS OR PHASED OUT, OR PIECEMEAL DESTROYED, THAT WE HAVE A LONG-TERM INTEREST THERE WE ARE GOING TO KEEP PROTECTING. END QUOTE.

2. ON BASIS OF TESTIMONY, AND CHECKING WITHIN STATE DEPARTMENT, IT APPEARS FINDLEY DOES NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC PLAN IN MIND. A PHONE CALL TO FINDLEY'S OFFICE UNPRODUCTIVE BECAUSE OF VACATIONING PERSONNEL. CONGRESSMAN IS EXPECTED BACK END OF THE MONTH AND WILL QUERY HIM FURTHER, IF YOU SO DESIRE. ROGERS

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